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Abstract
The resource-based Central Asian countries Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
constitute a special case for fiscal decentralization. Political and administrative centrali-
zation is accompanied by the centralized administration of resource rents and weak gov-
ernance structures on local levels.
Following best practices, fiscal decentralization is on the reform agenda in all three
transition countries. As advocated in economic literature and indicated in empirical evi-
dence, policymakers expect positive results on macroeconomic outcomes as well as on
overall state governance. But the mechanism for the positive effects of fiscal decentrali-
zation is the creation of appropriate incentives by transferring information rights and
authority to the local levels. How do the centralized states of Central Asia apply fiscal
decentralization and what are the outcomes of their policies?
To answer this question, we analyze the progress of fiscal decentralization in Ka-
zakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan since independence. In all three countries we
observe high levels of fiscal decentralization. The de-facto institutional design of fiscal
decentralization, however, is not appropriate to make incentive mechanisms work. Fis-
cal autonomy at the revenue and expenditure side is almost absent, and the transfer sys-
tem lacks transparency and predictability. Administrative and political centralization are
the drivers of this institutional design and create obstacles for the merits of fiscal decen-
tralisation to materialize.
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Introduction
Economic literature generally favours a substantial degree of fiscal decentralization
along the principle of subsidiarity. Tailoring outputs to local needs, fostering intergo-
vernmental competition, experimentation and innovation in locally provided goods and
services, and the promotion of efficient use of resources constitute the merits of fiscal
decentralization. However, the merits will not realize unless fiscal decentralization is
implemented together with administrative and political decentralization and strong go-
vernance-structures. Empirical evidence of transition countries shows how weak gov-
ernance and limited political competition may create adverse effects of fiscal decentrali-
zation. However, the Chinese example demonstrates the fiscal decentralization can
proof efficient in centralised states as well.
Against this background the resource-based Central Asian countries Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan constitute a special case. Political centralisation is ac-
companied by the centralised administration of resource rents and weak governance
structures on local levels. Fiscal decentralization is on the reform agenda. Following
minor reforms of the fiscal sphere new Budget Laws came into force in all countries
(Turkmenistan 1996, Uzbekistan 2001, Kazakhstan 2005). Recently these laws have
been supplemented by laws on administrative decentralization. Soon they will be fol-
lowed by the increasing of voter control. In Kazakhstan, formerly appointed regional
governors are going to be elected starting in 2006, in Uzbekistan this is planned for
2006 or 2007. Even in Turkmenistan governors of smaller administrative entities will be
elected during 2006/2007, and governors of regions in 2008. At the same time, democ-
racy scores for all these countries show a clear downward trend and the economic de-
pendency from revenues accrued in natural resource production grows. This casts doubt
on the political willingness to transfer rights to the local level and the voters.
Under these circumstances, can  fiscal decentralization in Central Asia constitute an
efficient solution to fiscal and administrative problems?  Do we observe real fiscal de-
centralization in these countries ? How far do the Central Asia states follow the success-
ful model of fiscal decentralsation in centralised China? To answer these questions, we
analyze the quality of progress towards fiscal decentralization in Kazakhstan, Uzbe-
kistan and Turkmenistan. Chapter I starts with insights from literature, Chapter II provi-
des an overview on fiscal decentralization and major reforms in the countries under con-
sideration. Chapter III is devoted to administrative decentralization. Chapter IV analyzes
expenditure assignment. Chapter V describes the pace of revenue sharing and as-
signment , the effectiveness of the solution of vertical and horizontal imbalances is dis-
cussed in Chapter VI. Chapter VII is devoted to the sub-national borrowing in three
countries.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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Chapter 1. Theoretical Considerations
Traditional economic theory generally is in favour of administrative and fiscal decen-
tralization. According to Hayek (1945), better access to local information will improve
the efficiency of providing public goods. Tiebout (1965) argues that competition among
jurisdicitions has a positive influence on the quality of public goods provision as citi-
zens are able to “vote by feet”. Welfare can be increased if an appropriate assignment of
taxes and responsibilities is chosen (Musgrave, 1959). A higher degree of decentraliza-
tion is assumed to enhance the accountability of local governmental bodies (Oates,
1972). Underlying assumptions of these models include a benevolent state and benevo-
lent state agents, factor mobility, and skilled human capital at the local level – condi-
tions that will hardly be met in the Central Asian transitional economies.
Second generation theories of decentralization come closer to Central Asian reality
and question the benevolence of government officials. They focus on the incentives cre-
ated by decentralization. The seminal papers of Weingast (1995), Weingast/Qian (1997)
and Qian/Roland (1997) on “Market preserving federalism” apply advances in the new
theory of the firm to questions of decentralization. They argue that the appropriate de-
centralization of information and authority will limit the “state predation” problem
(North, 1990) by setting positive incentives for individuals to take risk and make effort
today. On the other hand, appropriate decentralization will reduce the “soft budget con-
straint” problem (Kornai, 1986) by setting negative incentives for officials for bailing
out inefficient projects or firms. In both cases, the credibility of the central govern-
ment’s commitments to the local level plays as decisive role. High transaction costs for
central government intervention, e.g. the political costs of confiscating local tax reve-
nues above the planned level, will be essential for this credibility. The experience of
fiscal decentralization in China serves for illustrating incentive mechanisms through
decentralization.
Based on both strands of theory, a growing albeit contradictory literature discusses
the effects of decentralization on corruption and overall governance. Both indicators
rank comparatively low for Central Asian countries and might get better via mecha-
nisms of decentralization. If “voting by feet” can take place, decentralization will induce
less corruption (Breton, A. 1996). In contrast, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) based on the
theory of industrial organisation argue that decentralization may lead to an cumulative
overgrazing of the bribe base, if the central government is too weak to control and pun-
ish lower levels of government. Tanzi (1995) adds from political economy, that decen-
tralization under limited political competition causes a mutual dependence between lo-
cal elites and inhabitants, which leads to an aggravation of corruption on the local level
if decentralization is not controlled.
The discussion of effects on overall governance is similar. If local politicians will be
punished by voters in case of mismanagement, fiscal decentralization is expected to
improve overall governance (Seabright, P., 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). This is
rejected by Blanchard and Shleifer (2000), who point out the risks of local capture of
political power (buying of political decisions by business and individuals) resulting fromFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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the proximity of the involved parties. Contrasting Russia and China in a small model,
the authors argue for strong political control and even political centralisation accompa-
nying decentralization in countries with weak democratic institutions. This argument is
based mainly on Riker (1964), who argued that the strength of the national party system
is more important for controlling local politicians than administrative regulations or
constitutional arrangements. Hence, in the centralised states of Central Asia, we should
generally expect a positive influence of fiscal decentralization on corruption and gov-
ernance.
The empirical literature on effects of decentralization produced highly mixed results.
Relating decentralization to growth, cross-country studies in general support the exis-
tence of positive effects of fiscal decentralization (Huther and Shah, 1996). Studies ex-
amining developing countries apart find no links between decentralization and growth
(Woller and Philipps, 1998), and some even report a slightly negative relationship (Da-
voodi an Zou 1998). Single-country studies for China show positive (Lin and Liu, 2000)
as well as negative (Zhang and Zou, 1998) relationships.
Regarding corruption and governance, one finds more consistent results in cross-
country-studies. Fismann and Gatti (2002) as expected observe a strong negative rela-
tionship between fiscal decentralization in government expenditure and corruption.
However, corruption and governance deteriorate, if the reliance on the local revenue
base exceeds a certain level, local capture being the most probable explanation (de
Mello/ Barenstein, 2001). These somewhat contradictory results illustrate the problems
of the measurement of fiscal decentralization, discussed by Ebel and Yilmaz (2002).
Linking fiscal decentralization and political institutions by testing Rikers theory, Eniko-
polov and Zhuravskaya (2003) find out, that weak parties worsen the effect of fiscal
decentralization. Most interesting, their results show positive effects of centrally ap-
pointed versus locally elected local politicians on overall growth and quality of govern-
ment.
Empirical research on fiscal decentralization in post-soviet transition countries so far
is restricted to Russia and an empirical testing of the incentive-mechanisms. Using panel
data from 2118 Russian municipalities, Slinko (2002) shows, that regional disparities
increased with fiscal decentralization, because delayed enterprise restructuring and
lacking market institutions hampered the positive results of better incentives on the local
level. Timofeev (2002) tests this effect of decentralization on soft-budget-constraints of
local enterprises using panel data of 72 Russian regions from 1995-1997. His results
demonstrate, that only retained taxes grant for less subventions, whereas decentraliza-
tion via increased transfers or shared taxes worsens soft budget constraints substantially.
Desai, Freiman and Goldberg (2005) extend this relationship to regional growth indica-
tors using a comparable data set and produce similar results. Resource-rich rentier re-
gions as well as extremely poor regions are identified as vulnerable because of their
“unearned income streams” who limit the positive possible effects of fiscal decentrali-
zation. On the other hand, Zhuravskaya (2000) by analyzing Russian panel data from
1992-1997 shows that expansions of the local tax base were almost entirely offset by
reduced central transfers in the following year. This ratchet effect clearly creates no in-
centives on the local level.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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As for Central Asia, several conclusions can be drawn for our analysis of fiscal de-
centralization. First, the assumptions of traditional theories are too restrictive on the
background of the countries under consideration. Decentralization per se cannot guar-
antee positive effects, as empirical studies show. Second, according to new theory it is
the appropriate design of decentralization that matters. Only if information and authority
are transferred to local levels and the credibility of the central government is sufficient,
incentives mechanisms will work. Empirical evidence especially from Russia illustrates
some pitfalls of fiscal decentralization. Hence we should consider not only quantitative
indicators, but the quality of decentralization. Third, if strong democratic institutions
and high factor mobility are missing, fiscal decentralization should be accompanied by
strong political control to induce a positive influence on growth and governance indica-
tors. Centralised states per se are not harmful to the merits of fiscal decentralization, as
the example of China demonstrates. In rentier regions, incentive mechanisms of fiscal
decentralization may be reduced. Again, it is the quality and the design of decentraliza-
tion that plays a decisive role.Fiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Chapter 2. First insights
An international comparison of the status quo of decentralization indicators as presented
in Graph 1 may lead to the conclusion that fiscal decentralization in Turkmenistan, Ka-
zakhstan, and Uzbekistan is comparable with OECD countries. In 2001 the expenditures
of local budgets of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan constituted 10%, 12%,
and 15% of GDP respectively, which is comparable with OECD countries whose avera-
ge weight of local budgets in GDP at this time constituted 14.9%. The weight of local
budget revenues without transfers in the consolidated budget for the year 2001 in Turk-
menistan constituted 29% which is slightly below the OECD average indicator of that
year (32%).
Graph1:  International Comparison of Fiscal Decentralization*
Weight of Local budget expenditures in GDP
in 2001
Weight of local revenues in Consolidated
budgets in 2001
Source: OECD Economic outlook 2004: Fiscal relations across levels of government; Ministries of Finan-
ce (MoF) of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, own calculations.
Note: * revenues and expenditures were taken net of intergovernmental transfers.
At the expenditure side, the picture of high indicators of fiscal decentralization is va-
lid for the whole period of fiscal reforms in all three countries (Table 1). In Kazakhstan,
the weight of local expenditures in GDP during fiscal reforms has increased from 7% in
1997 to 11% in 2004. Turkmenistans ratio of local expenditures remained nearly un-
changed in comparison to 1995 and constituted 10% for 2003. Uzbekistans local expen-
diture to GDP decreased gradually from 18% in 1997 to 14% in 2004. The importance
of local government expenditures in total state expenditures has even increased in Ka-
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zakhstan and Turkmenistan in comparison to the 90
th (up to 49% and 51% respectively),
while for Uzbekistan the weight of local budget expenditures varies within the range of
51-56% for the last 7 years.
Table 1.  Major indicators of Fiscal decentralization in Central Asia
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Weight of State (consolidated) budget expenditures in GDP
K a z a k h s t a n 2 62 02 22 32 32 32 12 22 2
T u r k m e n i s t a n 2 0 - - - 2 42 21 71 9 -
Uzbekistan 33 32 33 31 29 27 26 25 26
Weight of local expenditures in GDP
Kazakhstan - 7 9 11 12 12 10 11 11
Turkmenistan 9 - - - 11 10 9 10 -
U z b e k i s t a n - 1 81 71 71 51 51 41 31 4
Weight of local expenditures w/o transfers in GDP
K a z a k h s t a n - 5 7 91 0 1 18 8 8
Turkmenistan 7 - - - 6 6 5 5 -
U z b e k i s t a n - 1 51 31 51 31 21 21 01 2
Weight of local expenditures in state budget
Kazakhstan - 34 41 46 50 52 48 48 49
T u r k m e n i s t a n 4 3 - - - 4 74 54 95 1 -
U z b e k i s t a n - 5 65 15 45 25 55 55 35 5
Weight of local revenues w/o transfers in state budget
Kazakhstan - 23 36 47 44 47 36 38 36
T u r k m e n i s t a n 3 5 - - - 2 62 92 72 9 -
U z b e k i s t a n - 5 54 85 14 54 54 54 14 3
Source: Own calculations based on WDI 2005, MoF of Kazakhstan, Turkmenmillichasabat (2005) “De-
centralization of state governance and local self-government development in Turkmenistan”, mimeo based
on the data of Turkmenistan MoF, Nutridinov, Haydarov (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in Uzbekistan”,
Tashkent, mimeo
At the revenue side signs of increasing fiscal centralisation can be found. With
respect to local budget revenues without central transfers during reforms, for Ka-
zakhstan this indicator has decreased from 47% in 2001 to 36% in 2004. For Uzbekistan
this ratio also decreased from 45% in 2001 to 43% in 2004 however remained far above
OECD average. For all three countries any decline in the level of other than transferFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
7
revenues in local budget funding after 1999 was compensated with a rise in intergo-
vernmental transfers. This development may be explained by the fact, that centrally as-
signed tasks have been transferred to the local level. But it also implies a more limited
scope of own responsibilities and a lack of autonomy for the regions.
In Central Asia these widely accepted measures of fiscal decentralization do not tell
the true story. As further analysis will show, de facto levels of fiscal decentralization in
all three countries are considerably lower than in the OECD area. A highly autocratic
governance manner, non-transparency of fiscal operations, and discretionary distribution
of revenues are only some of the reasons for qualitative distortion of the usual decentra-
lization indicators.
The existence of extra-budgetary centralized funds mostly fed by resource rents adds
a substantial quantitative distortion to the indicators. For two reasons this distortion will
not be corrected for in this paper: First, the amounts of extra-budgetary funds can be
estimated in Kazakhstan and, on far less secure grounds in Uzbekistan, but have to be
guessed in Turkmenistan. Second, we aim at a qualitative evaluation of fiscal decentra-
lization. In case of centralized funds, mostly under direct presidential control, the legal
influence of local levels on their spending is zero, whereas the real influence based on
personal ties, lobbying, extortion or bribing is hard to access.
Characterizing the starting points
The collapse of the USSR led to a substantial worsening of the fiscal situation in the
countries under consideration. During Soviet times, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ka-
zakhstan received substantial transfers from Moscow
1. After the breaking up of the So-
viet Union these transfer-dependent countries had to cope with a simultaneous collapse
of incomes caused by transformation recession, and the unexpected need to finance ex-
penditures stemming from the crash of the labour market and the social systems
2. The
fiscal imbalances led to debt accumulation, non-payments in the state sector and the
accumulation of tax arrears, especially in value-added tax (VAT). Inefficient and not
legalized institutional settings like mutual settlements between different tiers together
with tax offsets began to establish and imposed a heavy burden on future fiscal reforms.
All FSU countries inherited the Soviet system of intergovernmental financing, often
named as “Russian doll” model. The relationships between Moscow and the 15 re-
publics were taken as a model and replicated in the republics at all levels of the govern-
                                                
1 For instance, after the break-up in 1992, Uzbekistan lost 18% of his GDP in kind of transfer from Mos-
cow. Transfers from USSR budget to Kazakhstan constituted nearly 14% of GDP in 1990 (Source: The
Economist (2003)  “Kazakhstan: country profile”, Economist Intelligence Unit, Y 40251, pp. 30
//www.eiu.com.)
2 Social spending obligations of local governments had to be increased due to release of state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) from “objects of social infrastructure” that provided local infrastructure services in soviet
times (for instance roads, heating, electricity, sewerage, health services, etc.). The states also had to finan-
ce pension systems.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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ment. The negative elements of this system include a lack of local autonomy, a poor
legislative basis of fiscal transactions, a high level of intended non-transparency, and
excessive equalization between regions. The budgetary process and public administrati-
on were conducted within the framework of dual subordination of central and local go-
vernments and a general uncertainty concerning the responsibilities of different tiers.
Although the expenditures assignment seemed appropriate, it lacked explicit rules for
implementation. Expenditure needs in the FSU were determined by the application of
quantitative expenditure norms that were not oriented towards ex-post audit and thus
hampered local autonomy.
Concerning the revenue side, the local government had little autonomy as well. Re-
venue-formation of local levels was mainly based on shared revenues from turnover,
enterprise profit tax (EPT) and progressive personal income tax (PIT) collected directly
from state-owned enterprises according to the registration principle
3. The latter source
of revenues was dwarfed by the wage ceilings essential for revenues collections due to
the high share of public sector in the economies
Different kinds of direct and indirect subsidies provided on ad-hoc gap-filling basis
and supplemented by soft budget constraints and mutual settlements served  for solving
issues of vertical and horizontal imbalances. During budgeting, the called amounts were
cut according to the revealed revenue capacity of the regions. This made it impossible
for local governments to plan and execute their budgets efficiently. Due to the lack of
legislative provisions, bargaining became an integral part of the budget process. The
outcome to a great extent depended on the political influence of the head of a particular
oblast and his personal ties to upper levels of the government. In general, the system of
tax sharing, subsidies and transfers was non-transparent, incompatible with the prin-
ciples of predictability and stability, and created an adverse incentive structure at the
local level.
                                                
3  the registration principle implies that the tax is collected according to the place of the official registry of
the enterpriseFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Chapter 3. Status Quo and Reforms in Administrative and 
Fiscal Decentralization
Kazakhstan
Status Quo: The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted in 1995 laid the
foundations for upcoming administrative reforms. It defines Kazakhstan as an unitary
state with a strong position for the President and two houses of parliament. The local
administration consists of elected local self-administrative bodies Maslikhates who
should represent the interests of the population and define measures that are necessary to
defend these interests, and appointed by the president local executive bodies Akimates,
responsible for the social and economic development of the respective territory and sub-
ordinate to state organs. Akyms of regional and district level de jure could be dismissed
by a 2/3 majority of the Maslikhat. In practice the country lacks democracy and law en-
forcement. President Nazarbayev has headed the country since independence and
strengthened his power via frequent amendments to the Constitution
4. The legislative
provisions that allow the execution of local  government de facto are not applied
5. The
Maslikhates function without own budgets and enjoy no fiscal autonomy.
The administrative territory of Kazakhstan is divided into three tiers: 14 oblasts plus
two cities with special status (Astana and Almaty), 160 regions and 79 cities that have
status of a region, and villages (200 villages and 2150 village districts). Local budgets
and the budget of the Republic function independently and after consolidation represent
the state budget. De jure, all administrative tiers are involved into the process of budg-
eting. De-facto and de jure the local governments lack the power to set up their budgets.
The MoF determines revenues and expenditures of the budget by applying norms for
expenditures. The local budgets formally are to be approved by the respective Maslik-
hates once the republic level budget is approved and the volume of intergovernmental
transfers is set. Local budgets execution reports are to be published quarterly in the
press. An auditing commission of the local Maslikhat should conduct control over the
local budget execution.
Administrative Decentralization: In fact the country has undertaken several measures
to strengthen the power of local levels via legislation. Major legislative acts concerning
these questions are the laws “On the budget system”(1991) and "On local representative
and executive bodies of Republic of Kazakhstan"(1993). These laws empowered local
representatives to decide on subnational budgets and to control the use of their funds.
They announced subnational budgets as independent, and prohibited the interference of
the higher governmental levels. In fact the laws failed to define the division of tasks
between oblast and rayon levels as well as between center and regions. According to the
                                                
4 Economist Intelligence Unit (2003) “Kazakhstan: country profile”, Y 40251 //www.eiu.com
5 For example, the right to dismiss Akym has never being executed by any Maslikhat. Source: RGP Insti-
tute for Economic Research (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in Kazakhstan” Almaty, mimeo￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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1995 Constitution within two years the law on local self-governance should have been
adopted. However, the legislative loop-hole has not been filled yet, the law is still in the
drafting process. Other major legislative acts of these times aiming at decentralization
were the laws “On the system of local representative and executive bodies under the
circumstances of administrative and territorial settings”, and the law “On the budget
system” (1996). At the same time however the President was successful in further
strengthening his central power with the approval of the Order “On the governance of
the Republic of Kazakhstan” that had the power of a Constitutional law. Only in 2001
the new law “On Local state administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan” was adop-
ted. This law set major definitions, tasks, requirements, and limitations for local repre-
sentative and local state executive bodies. In the same year, in 28 districts experimental
elections of Akyms took place.
6 Till now, however, formal decentralization is counter-
vailed by the centralization of power at the presidential and ministerial level.
Fiscal Decentralization: The history of fiscal reforms is comparable to that of admi-
nistrative reforms. The year 1995 saw a major tax reform towards international stan-
dards with the adoption of the law “On taxes and non-tax payments” (1995). The num-
ber of taxes was reduced from 50 to 11. The law also changed the major tax rates and
defined local taxes. But once again the central government retained substantial power in
the settings of these local taxes and the independence of local budgets did not increase
to a substantial level. The new law “On the budget system” (1999), brought several in-
novations for intergovernmental relations. First, the law eventually provided the legisla-
tive basis for the division of tasks among different levels of government. Second, the
local budgets have been assigned new significant revenue sources in the form of a social
tax. Third, more responsibilities were pushed down to the local level. Fourth, extra-
budgetary funds were incorporated into the budget. Fifth, the system of dotations and
withdrawals was introduced. The new Tax Code 2002 and the Budget Code 2004 once
again reformed the local revenues and modified local borrowing regulations. The Bud-
get Code clarified rules of local budget drafting, established a unified budget classifica-
tion, and explicitly assigned the tasks among second and third government tiers. The
law contains provisions that favor more openness and transparency of public finance.
Transfers without formula basis were defined for the period of 3 years (instead of one),
and the principle one tax for one budget was set. Extra-budgetary funds do not exist any
longer. However, the Oil-stabilisation fund, established in 2001 and fed by rents from
natural resource extraction, continues to grow to substantial amounts and constitutes a
shift towards the centralization of financial resources.
Turkmenistan
Status Quo: According to the constitution, Turkmenistan can be defined as a democratic
and presidential republic. De jure the power is divided into executive, legislative repre-
                                                
6 Public Policy Research Center (2004):”Razvitie mestnogo samoupravlenija. strategiceskie voprosy.,
Policy studies No. 2, Almaty, June 2004Fiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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sented by the Khalk Maslakhaty (peoples’ council) and judicial power. On the local
level, the executive powers rest in the hands of the hyakims, who are assigned and dis-
missed by the President
7. Local self- governance is carried out by the so-called Genge-
shes (peoples councils), elected for the term of 5 years and governed by the Archyn
(mayor), is elected by and accountable to the members of Gengesh. The Gengesh should
define the major guidelines of the social and economic development, approve the budget
and the report on its execution, supervise the local tax administration, etc. The relations
and division of responsibilities between hyakims and Gengeshes are defined by legisla-
tion. De-facto the local councils enjoy no autonomy or decision–making authority; the
life-long President Nijasow concentrates the power in an autocratic manner upon him-
self
8.
The territory of Turkmenistan is divided into five oblasts (velayats), and further into
rayons and etraps. The budgetary system of Turkmenistan is represented by the Republi-
can budget that formerly also incorporated the state targeted funds and local budgets.
The Gengeshes are also allowed to create extra-budgetary funds. Local budgets include
the budgets of oblast level, the budgets of cities of republic subordination, the budgets
of rayons, and the budgets of cities of rayon subordination, settlements, and villages.
Administrative Decentralization: The legislative basis for the administrative decen-
tralization was mainly elaborated in the mid-nineties. The laws “On the Cabinet of Mi-
nisters of Turkmenistan” (1995) and the law “On Hyakims”
9 (1995) define the foundati-
ons of these bodies and set their areas of responsibility and relations with the other go-
vernment bodies. However, the legislation fails to define the procedure of responsibili-
ties assignment. The constitutional base of the local self-governance (The law “On Gen-
gesh”) was developed only in 2003. In spite of formal administrative decentralization, a
process of de facto administrative centralisation can be observed. Local hyakims are
appointed and dismissed by the president in shortening intervals of time with and
without reasonable explanations. Under these circumstances, competition among regi-
ons and incentives on the local level do not play a role. The effective legislation con-
tains provisions that do not form grounds for independency of the local government
formation
10.
Fiscal Decentralization: As in Kazakhstan, fiscal decentralization has been on the re-
form agenda for several years. During 1991-1993 major shared taxes such as VAT, PIT,
and EPT were introduced and reformed. A resolution of the President set an exhaustive
list of local taxes. The Law “On the budget system” was introduced in the year 1996, but
its provisions poorly addressed the issues of fiscal decentralization. Its contribution to
the clarity of tasks was very moderate. The problem of vertical imbalance was tried to
                                                
7 There are 6 hiakims of velayats, 47 hiakims of etraps, 7 hiakims of city subordination etraps, and 12
hiakims in the cities of velayat subordination.
8 The Economist (2003) “Turkmenistan: Country profile”, Economist Intelligence Unit, Y 38183 p. 31
//www.eiu.com; in fact, Turkmenistan constitutes one of the strictetes dictatorships in the world
9 Hyakims are representatives of the President at the local levels
10 Local representative assembly in Turkmenistan, Economist Intelligence Unit (2003) “Turkmenistan:
Country profile”, Y 38183, pp. 31 //www.eiu.com￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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be solved with non-transparent methods such as revenue sharing and non-formula based
transfers. The tax reform of 2000 allowed a reduction in the number of the numerous
local taxes with little revenue potential. This decision was secured by law only in 2004
with the approval of the Tax Code 2004. However, for the local budgets these reforms
implied only a marginal increase in revenue autonomy and hence did not contribute to
predictability and stability of local revenues.
The existence of extra-budgetary funds aggravates the de facto centralization of the
fiscal sphere. Although in 1994 all extra-budgetary funds were incorporated into the
budget, in the years 1996-2000 Turkmenistan has developed a complicated system of
state-purpose funds
11. Although these funds once again became part of the consolidated
budget in 1998, they are governed in a non-democratic manner solely depending upon
decisions of the President. In addition to these official funds several unofficial and unre-
ported presidential funds serve the purpose of accumulating rents from resource extrac-
tion.
Uzbekistan
Status Quo: The administrative reforms in Uzbekistan started with the adoption of the
Constitution (1992), which defined three branches of power and three administrative
tiers. As in the other Central Asian countries, the President has been provided with sub-
stantial competence. Structure and responsibilities of local governments are fixed in the
law “On local State governance” (1993). In 1996 the President undertook some steps
towards re-concentration and eliminated the administrations of cities of district subordi-
nation. The state representative body in oblasts, rayons, and cities is the council of peo-
ples deputies headed by the hokim; both de jure are in duty for a term of 5 years. Oblast
level-hokims and the hokim of Tashkent city are assigned and dismissed by the presi-
dent, hokims of rayons and cities are assigned and dismissed by higher-level hokims. In
practice, hokims on all levels do not stay in duty the whole term, but depend on presi-
dential ad-hoc decisions. In 1995, President Karimov was successful in strengthening
his power and prolonging his term of presidency from 5 to 7 years. Due to political tur-
moil and outbreaks of violence in the capital and the Ferghana valley during the last
years, in spite of further decentralization measures a substantial tightening of political
control and concentration of power can be observed. The local governors or hokims that
concentrate local decision-making are in fact part of the system of the president.
In Uzbekistan, the traditional institutions of citizens’ local self-governance, the so-
called mahallas, play a special role and supplement the system of local state bodies. The
mahalla itself comprises a regional district with not more than 5000 inhabitants. The
                                                
11  1996 The State fund of development of Agriculture;
1999 The State Fund of development of Ashgabad
1998 The State fund of development of health care in Turkmenistan
2000 The State Fund of golden century development of TurkmenistanFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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administrative organ of this district is called mahalla committee or only mahalla. This
institution represents a non-government non-profit organization, which traditionally
served as a link between an individual and the rest of the world and performed the func-
tion of a self-governmental body.
12. Unlike in other Central Asian countries mahallas
were formalized in Uzbekistan and assigned certain governmental functions
13. The citi-
zens’ representatives of the mahalla select their executive bodies (head, advisors, com-
missions) themselves. On average about 25 inhabitants of one mahalla are engaged in
self-governance
14. However, with respect to decentralization, the local self-government
in Uzbekistan is rather limited. In fact it performs the given policies of formal executive
structures that oversee the execution of administrative orders by higher tiers.
15
Uzbekistan is divided into 12 provinces, the city of Tashkent and autonomous repub-
lic Karakalpakstan. The system of local state executive bodies includes oblast, rayon,
and city hokimiyats. The budgetary structure is represented by independently function-
ing local and republican budgets, the budget of the republic of Karakalpakstan, and
state targeted funds. The local budgets also include budgets of rayons, cities, and
oblasts. Budgets of rayons include rayon budgets and budgets of rayons of city subordi-
nation. The consolidated state budget is prepared by the MoF based on norms of expen-
ditures and approved by the Parliament. After the state budget is centrally approved, the
respective hokimiyats and other key spending units are informed about major parameters
of the budget. The representative local governmental bodies approve the local budget
and report on their execution. The structure of fiscal decentralization implies a dual link
between local governmental bodies and central financial bodies. Mahallas serve as a
link between the state and the recipients of aid.
Administrative Decentralization: Since 1996 little attention was paid to administrati-
ve decentralization. The only exception relates to the new law on local self-governance
of citizens (1999) that increased the formal role of the mahallas. They became respon-
sible for the delivery of allowances to non-working mothers of children under two years
age and foodstuff to single pensioners. However, the mahallas have no access to auto-
nomous financial resources. During 2002-2004 attempts towards governmental reforms
were undertaken. In 2002, the President addressed a commitment to the Parliament (Oliy
Majlis) aimed at de-concentration and gradual transfer of central powers and functions
to lower state bodies and citizens’ self-governance. However, the latter did not bring any
concrete result yet.
16 In 2003 some re-concentration took place via incorporation of the
urban district into the respective city hokimiyat. In the year 2003, new law “On the Ca-
binet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan” was adopted. Uzbekistan made sub-
                                                
￿￿ Traditional functions of mahallas include maintaining of social order, provision of aid, mediation of
property disputes, dealing with family issues, and etc.
￿￿ However, it cannot be treated as an institution of local self-governance in a classical way. For instance,
they have no access to autonomous financial resources stated by legislation.
￿￿ However, only two of them receive salary from the local budget. The rest are the volunteers.
￿￿ Nutridinov, Haydarov (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in Uzbekistan”, Tashkent, mimeo
16 Peter Epstein and Matthew Winter (2004): “Assessment of Intergovernmental Relations and Local Go-
vernance in the Republic of Uzbekistan”. The Urban Institute, Washington, February 2004, p. 37￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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stantial steps towards reducing the number of government officials that also had impli-
cations for the structure of local representative bodies. Currently, Uzbekistan is on its
way towards implementing a treasury, which would constitute a certain element of
control of the fiscal process.
Fiscal Decentralization: Reforms in the fiscal sphere have been substantial. The mid-
nineties were the times of establishing the tax system. The Tax Code (1997) and the
structure of the Tax service (1997) were set. The Tax Code defined the list of local taxes
and made the Cabinet of Ministers responsible for developing procedures for the calcu-
lation of local taxes and fees and their payment into the budget. Two important revenue
sources (property tax and land tax) were defined as local taxes. At the time the Law “On
the Budget system” (1999) replaced the soviet-time law “On the budgetary right of Re-
public of Uzbekistan and local councils of workers of the Republic of Uzbekistan”,
major budgetary reforms were started. The legislative base for formation, allocation, and
execution of budgets, and a (not sufficiently detailed) assignment of tasks to local go-
vernment was set. However, this law mainly concerned the state and republic level bud-
gets, provisions on the local budgets were scarce. Only in 2001 the order of the Cabinet
of Ministers of Uzbekistan stated more detailed rules on the procedure of the compilati-
on and the implementation of the state budget, as well as on the consideration of local
budgets. Provisions in relation to an external budget audit were set in 2002.
To sum up, three facts characterize the decentralization process in the countries under
consideration: First, administrative and fiscal decentralization proceeded with different
pace, the latter progressing quicker. Second, provision and implementation of laws con-
cerning decentralization differ a lot. Due to the lack of democracy in the administrative
sphere this gap in the administrative sphere is wider than in the fiscal sphere.
17 Third,
local self-governance as an element of political decentralization in spite of distinctive
laws does not play a role. From three facts, it can be concluded that decentralization in
the fiscal sphere in all countries is hampered by lacking administrative decentralization.
As long as local budgets are compiled on centrally defined parameters and not on actual
costs and local needs, fiscal decentralization is merely formal.
                                                
17 Evidence suggests that elections at all levels are highly falsified and often manipulatedFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Chapter 4. Analysis of Expenditure assignment
A proper expenditure assignment is the first step for efficient decentralization. The clear
assignment of governmental tasks allows avoiding a populistic inspired discretion of
local authorities. In general, the expenditures assignment for an efficient provision of
public services should correspond with the principles of subsidiarity, territorial equiva-
lency, economies of scale and the consideration of externalities.
These general principles of good fiscal decentralization imply that tasks of national
dimension like defence, public order and justice, foreign relations, and tasks of educati-
on and health care of national importance should be assigned to the central level due to
their spillover effect. Social redistribution tasks should be financed at the expense of
central budget due to disparities in and possible inverse correlation of expenditures
needs and the revenues base. On the local level, the provision of utilities and general
education and health care services in proximity to the consuming population can impro-
ve the welfare of the population. Economic affairs tasks generally are to be accomplis-
hed by the central government, since sub-national governments are too small to finance
and administer them efficiently.
In centralized states a political reluctance to assign tasks to the local level is inherent.
Tasks with higher autonomy in spending, e.g. the carrying out of economic activities,
tend to stay with the central government. Tasks with little spending autonomy like
health, education and social protection can be transferred to the local level without loo-
sing control over their spending, especially if their volumes depend on centrally set
standards.
Kazakhstan
The legislative basis of expenditures assignment in Kazakhstan was brought about by
the budget reform of 1999 (see Annex I, Table I.1). Previously, the division of tasks at
the local level was not defined; the structure of expenditures at the lower level was sub-
ject to frequent changes and bargaining. For instance, in some oblasts schools were fi-
nanced from the oblast budget while in others they were financed from the rayons’ bud-
get.
18 In 1999, the general clarification of assignment rules and budget transparency was
improved by the incorporation of extra-budgetary funds that previously obscured the
fiscal decision-making at all levels. The responsibilities of local budgets have been en-
larged. According to the principle of territorial equivalency local governments became
responsible for tasks like the construction and maintenance of roads and streets of local
importance. However, some changes in the budget reform were arguable from the point
of effectiveness of fiscal decentralization. For instance, as a result of the reform, the
local government became responsible for provision of unemployment benefits and tar-
                                                
18 M. Mahmutova (2003) “Division of expenditure tasks between levels of budget system in Kazakhstan”,
Kazakhstan Institute of Management project research materials, p. 5)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
16
geted social assistance payments, imposing a high administrative and fiscal burden to
poorer regions.
The structure of local expenditures in 1998 shows that the general principles of sub-
sidiarity were upheld even before the reform (Table 2). National dimension tasks such
as defense and general public services were mainly assigned to the central government
level. The share of economic affairs tasks (e.g. fuel and energy sector, agriculture) as-
signed to the local budgets seems substantial, but its weight in total local expenditures is
tiny, which means local budgets do not have room for maneuver in this sphere. During
the period of 1998-2004, the role of the local budgets in financing education and health
care has increased from 78% to 88% and from 70% to 80% respectively. The share of
social protection tasks financed at the expense of local budgets fell from 29% in 1998 to
7% in 2004. After 1998, when the extra-budgetary funds were eliminated, the Republi-
can (Central) budget had to finance all the pensions on a pay as you go system, as well
as categorical benefits and social allowances, while the local budgets had to finance
poverty-related social assistance payments.
Table 2:  Kazakhstan: Share of local expenditures in the Consolidated Budget* (%)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
General public services 21 31 30 30 28 32 26
D e f e n s e 1 41 72 01 81 81 51 7
P u b l i c  o r d e r  a n d  j u s t i c e 2 52 32 42 22 11 92 1
E d u c a t i o n 7 88 38 48 18 68 88 8
H e a l t h - C a r e 7 08 18 67 88 38 38 2
Social protection** 84* 12 12 16 18 17 15
Utilities 100 100 100 100 100 100 98
Culture 45 74 73 68 64 62 65
Fuel and energy sector 14 43
A g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  h u n t i n g 1 91 72 31 41 31 61 3
Industrial construction 68 10 7 21 24 64 50
Transport - 71 58 41 29 32 33
O t h e r 3 43 97 15 48 37 35 3
D e b t  s e r v i c e 112233
T o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s 4 14 65 05 24 84 84 9
Source: Own calculations based on data from MoF of Republic Kazakhstan
Note: * The calculations do not take into account extra-budgetary funds.Fiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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The legislation that regulated intergovernmental relations was upgraded in 2005 with
the approval of the new Budget Code. The latter provides a more detailed assignment of
tasks assignment (e.g. it listed all types of social welfare payments that should be finan-
ced at the expense of local budgets). More importantly, the Budget Code of Kazakhstan
defined the redistribution of tasks at lower than oblast levels of government such as ray-
ons, cities, and re-assigned more social aid provisions to the central level of the go-
vernment.
Table 3:  Kazakhstan: Structure of local budget expenditures* (%)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
G e n e r a l  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s 4434354
D e f e n s e 2111222
P u b l i c  o r d e r  a n d  j u s t i c e 5444444
E d u c a t i o n 3 53 02 32 22 82 82 7
H e a l t h - C a r e 1 21 71 51 21 61 61 8
Social protection 29 9 7 8 10 9 7
Utilities 3 37877 1 1
C u l t u r e 3443445
F u e l  a n d  E n e r g y  s e c t o r ------1
A g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  h u n t i n g 1111111
I n d u s t r i a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n 1----1-
T r a n s p o r t -475466
O t h e r 5578864
D e b t  s e r v i c e -------
Source: Own calculations based on data from MoF of Republic Kazakhstan
Note: * the total expenditures are net of transfers
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan so far shows little progress concerning the legal assignment of tasks among
different budget levels according to the principles of clarity and subsidiarity (Annex I,
Table I.2 a and b)
19. The provisions of the budget legislation enforced in 1999 failed to
assign several tasks even at the centre-oblast level, and even in relation to tasks like de-
                                                
￿￿ Center for Economic Research (2004) “The major directions of reforming the government at the local
level” (in Russian) CER Report 2004/05, Tashkent, p. 17￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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fence and public order
20. Expenditures of authorities below the oblast levels are still not
assigned at all. In general, the budget reform implied an extension of local government
responsibilities. The responsibility for some social aid provision was transferred down
from the central to the local level. This aid is financed out of district budgets and ad-
ministered through the mahallas to guarantee an optimal targeting. Although this aim
seems to be reached,
21 in autocratic states the system obviously bears the risk of setting
wrong incentives on the local level and is reportedly misused for political control.
22
As stated earlier, the weight of local expenditures in the consolidated budget of Uz-
bekistan is quite high and has varied within the range of 51-56% for the period of 1996-
2004 and constituted 54% in 2004 (Table 4). Disaggregated data corroborate the as-
sumption, that albeit high indicators of decentralization, local levels in fact do not have
substantial financial scope for own policies. The share of social sphere expenditures that
include education, health-care, social welfare, culture, and sport expenditures financed
from local budgets rose from 79% in 1996 to 84% in 2004. Its weight in local expendi-
tures in the same period increased from 51% to 63% (Table 5). The same trend can be
observed for social protection. 88% of all social protection expenditures have been pus-
hed down from the central level to the regions. In sum, three quarters of all local budget
expenditures are spent for social measures, which have to be provided according to
centrally set laws and instructions. Adding the 16% for the execution of centrally plan-
ned investments, almost 90% of the local budgets are administered centrally.
Table 4:  Uzbekistan: Share of local expenditures in Consolidated budget* (%)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
T o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s 5 35 65 15 45 25 55 55 35 4
Social sphere
** 79 80 77 79 79 84 83 83 84
S o c i a l  p r o t e c t i o n 6 17 56 97 07 57 47 87 58 8
E c o n o m i c  e x p e n d i t u r e s 5 13 73 03 84 05 25 03 92 3
Financing centrally planned
i n v e s t m e n t s 5 35 95 25 05 95 85 96 16 8
Maintenance of state govern-
ment bodies and local bodies 343433442
O t h e r  e x p e n d i t u r e s 1 11 31 21 31 01 11 01 11 0
Source: Own calculations based on data from Nutridinov, Haydarov (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in Uzbekistan”,
Tashkent, mimeo
Note: *The calculation does not take into account extra-budgetary funds,
* Includes education, health-Care, social welfare, culture, and sport expenditures
                                                
￿￿  Nuritdinov, Haydarov (2005) “Fiscal Decentralization in Uzbekistan”, Tashkent, p.16
21 Coundouel, A./Marnie, S., : From Universal To Targeted Social Assistance: An Assessment Of The
Uzbek Experience. In: Moct-Most Nr. 4, 1999
22 Human Rights Watch (2003): “From House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees”, Human Rights
Watch Tashkent, September 2003, Vol 15, No.7 (D), TashkentFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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On the other side, during the transition process many tasks of executing economic af-
fairs formerly assigned to the regions have been shifted to the central level. The level of
total economic affairs expenditures financed from the state budget remains high, but the
share of economic affairs expenditures financed from the local budgets of Uzbekistan
has decreased from 51% to 23% during 1996-2004. The share of funds spent for these
purposes out of the local budgets decreased from 24% in 1997 to 6% in 2004. Because
disaggregated data of this budget heading are not accessible, it is impossible to state,
whether these shifts stem from a real centralization of tasks or from privatization and/or
reduced soft budget constraints.
Table 5:  Uzbekistan: Structure of local budget expenditures* (%)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Social sphere** 51 51 54 56 54 57 57 60 63
Total expenditures 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
S o c i a l  p r o t e c t i o n 1 31 31 21 21 11 01 11 11 1
Economic expenditures 12 8 10 8 7 8 8 9 6
Financing centrally planned
i n v e s t m e n t s 2 02 42 12 02 31 91 91 51 6
Maintenance of state govern-
ment bodies and local bodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O t h e r  e x p e n d i t u r e s 444455555
Source: Own calculations based on data from Nutridinov, Haydarov (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in Uzbekistan”,
Tashkent, mimeo
Note: * The calculations does not take into account extra-budgetary funds
** Includes Education, Health-care, Social Welfare, Culture, and Sport expenditures
Turkmenistan
In Turkmenistan, the 1996 law “On the budget system” provides only a broad and not
sufficiently detailed division of tasks among the central and the oblast level. Furthermo-
re, the centralized tasks of production (commercial purpose) and construction imply a
highly undesirable government intervention into business and local needs. Loopholes in
the legislation related to the division of financial responsibilities at the levels lower than
oblasts result in situations when expenditures assigned to the local level (especially
oblast-rayon level) are in fact defined by the higher-level governmental tiers and subject
to frequent changes and bargaining.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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Table 6  Turkmenistan: Share of local expenditures in Consolidated budget (%)
1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
TOTAL 77 43 47 45 49 51
Financing economic affairs 22 34 0 1 1 1
Education* 73 82 90 89 89 89
Culture 50 41 39 44 40 44
Health-care 86 79 80 79 80 80
Utilities** 98 n/a 100 100 100 100
Social provision 1 1 - - - -
Government 57 16 7 8 9 8
D e f e n s e ------
Public order - - 7 7 7 2
Source: Own calculations based on data from Turkmenmillichasbat (2005) “Decentralization of state governance and
local self-government development in Turkmenistan”, mimeo based on data from Turkmenistan MoF
Note: * contrary to classification effective in Turkmenistan, education expenditures include payment of stipends
** utility expenditures were excluded from economic affairs expenditures
In general, Turkmenistan shows a similar picture of high quantitative decentralization
indicators without de-facto decentralization. While the weight of local expenditures in
the consolidated budget falls from 77% in 1991 to 43% in 1995, it has revived to 51% in
2003 (Table 6). During this period, the local budgets have been assigned higher shares
of education expenditures and health care. Expenditures for financing utility functions
of Turkmenistan were 100% assigned to the local level. As water and natural gas in
Turkmenistan are distributed to the population at no cost, this increases the dependency
of the local budgets from centralized transfers and does not constitute decentralization.
As in Uzbekistan, the assigning of social tasks to the local level was accompanied by a
centralizing of economic affairs tasks. The share of economic affairs expenditures as-
signed to the local level declined from 22% in 1991 to mere 1%
23 in 2003. Since there
has been almost no privatization of state enterprises, for Turkmenistan this shift can be
explained only with centralization of formerly locally financed affairs. The structure of
local budget expenditures shows respective changes for the period of independence
(Table 7). Social services provision including education and health care became the pri-
ority of local budgets. While the share of local education expenditures constituted 17%
in 1991, it reached 31% in 1995 and 51% in 2003. Health-care expenditures consumed
nearly 23% of local budgets in 2000-2003. The weight of local economic expenditures
approached to zero.
                                                
23 Turkmenmillichasbat (2005) “Decentralization of state governance and local self-governance develop-
ment in Turkmenistan” p. 23, mimeo, these expenditures were mainly directed for financing support to
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Table 7:  Turkmenistan: Structure of local budget expenditures (%)
1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
F i n a n c i n g  e c o n o m i c  a f f a i r s * * 1 1 50000
Education* 17 31 53 52 49 51
C u l t u r e 112222
Health-care 10 17 23 23 22 22
Utilities 4 27 16 17 17 17
S o c i a l  p r o v i s i o n 011111
G o v e r n m e n t 123333
Public order - - 1 1 1 0
O t h e r 5 6 1 6 0054
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Own calculations based on data from Turkmenmillichasbat (2005) “Decentralization of state government and
local self-government development in Turkmenistan”, mimeo based on data from Turkmenistan MoF
Note: * contrary to classification effective in Turkmenistan, education expenditures include payment of stipends
** utility expenditures were excluded from economic affairs expenditures
In an comparative view, at the beginning of independence all countries under consi-
deration lacked explicit legislative provisions that defined a division of responsibilities.
In spite of this, the de-facto expenditure assignment to the local governments was gene-
rally in line with decentralization principles. During the reform years, against the back-
ground of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan’s reforms became the most pro-
minent. Thanks to the Budget Code approved in 2004, Kazakhstan is now closest to a
clear assignment of tasks at all levels, while the division of tasks in Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan remains unclear at lower than oblast level. However, in all countries the
reforms undertaken in tasks assignment lack clarity and economic justification. Local
budgets especially in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan became heavily burdened with the
financing of social tasks, whereas economic affairs financing keeps on decreasing.
Without some autonomy in spending, incentive mechanisms will not work.
Is there spending autonomy on the local level?
In all three countries the expenditure autonomy is limited in a number of ways. Norms
and regulations issued by the central government are aggravated by un-funded mandates.
Expenditure limits are set at the central level in all countries under consideration. In
Uzbekistan, each distinct local budget request has to refer directly to a particular article
of an official act as a justification for the expenditure. In Kazakhstan the provisions
establishing expenditure limits became even stricter. The Budget Code of Kazakhstan
that came into force in 2005 requires all expenditures of all programs and of all levels of￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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budgets to be based on the limits of expenditures
24. These limits are to be approved by
the budget commissions and are to be taken into account while composing the budget.
Thus, one could expect little degrees of freedom of local self-governance to define ex-
penditures.
For further examination of this question we look at the regional (oblast) variation of
per capita expenditures according to the functional classification of expenditures. A high
variation may reflect the ability of local governments to set own preferences and to con-
duct economic policy according to own needs. It may also reflect differences in the qua-
lity of local governance and administrative efficiency.
For Kazakhstan the coefficient of variation
25 shows rather low rates in 1998, who
more than tripled during reforms (Table 8). This is mostly due to the introduction of
official withdrawals, which became necessary as growing revenues from resource
extraction had led to serious regional disparities. The regional per-capita variation of
expenditures of Turkmenistan (Table 9) and Uzbekistan (Table 10) remained nearly at
the same level since the mid nineties. Most interesting, the largest contribution to the
variability in all countries stems from the smallest budget categories (e.g. financing
tasks from economic affairs). Relatively high per-capita expenditures variations in the
general public services seem to depend more on the number of administrative units
26
rather than on the quality of services delivered. Comparatively low levels of per capita
expenditures variation at the oblast level in all countries can be observed in the most
important categories such as education and health care suggesting about rather unified
priorities and little spending autonomy.
This analysis hints at the important role of centrally set minimum expenditure requi-
rements for education and health care sectors. To the other sectors the extremely scarce
financial resources seem to be redistributed as a residual. Further analyses will show,
along what lines this redistribution is organized. This suggests, that the influence of
centrally set limits is significant, whereas the budgetary autonomy of local governments
in all three countries in general is as limited as expected.
                                                
24 RGP Institute for Economic Research (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in Kazakhstan” Almaty, p 25,
mimeo,
25 the calculation of the coefficient is based on data on categorical local per capita expenditures by oblast
26 A rather high negative correlation coefficient of expenditures per capita and population by oblast in
each country is peculiar for Uzbekistan: it is close to -0.8. For Kazakhstan, it has increased in magnitude
after the reform and reached -0.79 in 2000. However, it declined in 2004 down to –0.53. For Turkmenis-
tan, it is still negative but less significant e.g. –0.39 for 2001 and –0.38 for 2003. At the same time, the
variation of distribution of population among oblasts is the highest in Kazakhstan, and the lowest in
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Table 8 Coefficient of variation of local per capita expenditures Kazakhstan*
1998 2002 2003 2004
Total 0.22 0.76 0.69 0.60
General public services 0.29 0.32 1.12 0.33
Defence 0.42 0.48 0.31 0.40
Public order and justice 0.44 0.38 0.33 0.35
Education 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.26
Health Care 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.24
Social welfare 0.22 0.31 0.29 0.20
Utilities 0.62 2.06 1.55 0.97
Culture 0.32 0.69 0.61 0.49
Fuel and energy complex - - 3.87 3.09
Agriculture and forestry 0.75 0.61 0.41 0.33
Industry 1.22 1.75 2.11 1.51
Transport - 0.83 0.94 1.05
Other 1.43 0.69 0.92 0.68
Debt servicing 2.24 2.35 2.93 2.71
Official transfers - 2.17 2.10 2.17
Source: Own calculations based on data from MoF of Republic Kazakhstan
Note: *  the calculations do not taking into account Astana city due to its exceptional status.
Table 9 Coefficient of variation of local per capita expenditures Turkmenistan
2001 2002 2003
 Total 0.21 0.15 0.20
 General public services 0.30 0.23 0.35
 Public and social services 0.17 0.14 0.16
 Education 0.07 0.13 0.10
 Health care 0.26 0.25 0.24
 Social 0.22 0.28 0.24
 Utilities 0.95 0.83 0.92
 Culture 0.43 0.39 0.42
 Economic affairs 1.40 1.92 1.40
 Transfers 1.08 2.45 2.27
Source: Own calculations based on data from Turkmenmillichasbat (2005) “Decentralization of state government and
local self-government development in Turkmenistan”, mimeo based on the data from MoF of Turkmenistan￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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Table 10 Coefficient of variation of local per capita expenditures Uzbekistan*
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.13
Social sphere 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13
Social protection 0.16 0.09 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20
Economic expenditures 0.46 0.43 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.48
Financing centrally planned
investments 0.68 0.70 0.51 0.36 0.29 0.41 0.33 0.24 0.26
Maintenance of state Govern-
ment bodies and local bodies 0.36 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.43
Other expenditures 0.32 0.48 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.52 0.25 0.34
Source: Own calculations based on data from Nutridinov, Haydarov (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in Uzbekistan”,
Tashkent, mimeo
Note: *  the calculations do not take into account Tashkent city due to its exceptional status.Fiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Chapter 5. Analysis of Revenues assignment and Sharing
According to conventional wisdom, the core for local revenues should consist of easily
administered taxes with an immobile tax base, a predictable revenue yield, and visible
sub-national government liabilities. Local governments should have an access to genui-
ne local revenues that are compatible with their responsibilities and they should have the
right to define the tax base/rate within the limits established on their own. Taxes that are
redistributive in nature, have important economies of scale, are sensitive to cyclical
fluctuations, and/or unevenly distributed such as value-added tax (VAT) and enterprise
profits tax (EPT) should be centralized. The progressive personal income tax (PIT) in
fact performs redistribution functions and in the presence of high regional disparities
may exacerbate the difference in the quality of public services provided locally. Rents
for natural resources extraction are generally treated as payment for ownership; in case
of the countries under consideration these resources constitute national wealth and the
rents should be assigned to the central level as well.
If revenues are assigned to create incentive effects at the local level, a certain share of
EPT and PIT should remain at the local level. This makes local governments interested
in creating a business-friendly environment and promoting local growth. However, long-
term credibility of the central governments commitment not to withdraw unexpected
surpluses from the local level is essential to make incentive mechanisms work. For nati-
ons rich in point-source natural resources this commitment creates a trade-off between
the promotion of local growth and growing regional disparities.
Table 11 Structure of local revenues in Kazakhstan
* (%)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
E P T 1 41 32 62 0 0 0 0
V A T 8442321
P I T 1 71 61 61 72 01 91 6
E x c i s e s 8211644
Social tax 0 31 25 32 35 33 28
Privatization and operati-
o n s  w i t h  c a p i t a l * 0001112
N o n - t a x  r e v e n u e s 9534112
O t h e r  t a x  r e v e n u e s 1 91 51 01 01 41 31 2
T r a n s f e r s 2 71 51 41 22 02 63 5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Own calculations based on the data from the MoF of Kazakhstan
Note: * The receipts from the sale of fixed capital in Kazakhstan are represented by revenues from sale of state prop-
erty, sale of goods from the state material reserve and sale of nontangible assets owned by the government￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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In Kazakhstan the pre-reform tax legislation enforced more than 50 taxes. In 1995
their number was cut to 11 and defined so-called “regulatory” (shared) and local taxes.
The list of local taxes included property tax, vehicle owner tax, land tax, and several
kinds of non-tax revenues. These genuine local taxes provided a small revenue base
potential. The sub-national governments even for local taxes (with the exception of land
tax) had no power to set the tax rates. With enforcement of the tax code in 2002, the
local administrations got the right to raise the standard rates of local taxes set by the Tax
Code by up to 50% and to set own rates for fines and administrative sanctions. (Appen-
dix II.1). These genuine local revenues over which the local government had some de-
gree of discretion allowed funding slightly more than 10% of local budgets. Thus, local
tax autonomy stayed limited.
As a result of the small genuine local tax base, the lion’s part of local revenues is
presented by the shared taxes VAT (including VAT on imports) and EPT (Table 11). In
1995 the assignment of tax revenues among regions became based on operational indi-
cators of an enterprise (depending on the part of the wage bill of the enterprise directed
to a particular region, the assets location, etc.) replacing the original principle based on
the administrative subordination of the enterprise. Thus the accountability for local
budgets grew, and incentives for the promotion of enterprise development might have
resulted. However, due to yearly changes in the assigned shares, the predictability for
the local level has been low.
The 1999 reforms brought major changes in the assignment of shared taxes. The as-
signed shares of taxes had been fixed in the annual Budget Laws and were unified for all
regions. The introduced so-called “social tax”
27 began to provide nearly 30% of funding
for the local budgets and as a tax paid by enterprises set positive incentives. But its de-
sign as a central tax, 100% assigned to the local budgets makes it a financing source
dependent on decisions taken centrally. By and by all vulnerable taxes were assigned to
the central level. For instance VAT (in 1997) and EPT (in 2002) previously collected by
the local budgets began to flow to the central level. A tendency of centralization was
included in the redirection of 50% of excises to the central level. The weight of progres-
sive PIT in local revenues increased from 16% in 1999 to 20% in 2002. The tax reform
of 2004 replaced the progressive PIT with a 10% flat rate and thus contributed to reduc-
tion of its weight in local revenues to 16%. A mere administrative feature concerning
the shared taxes adds to the dependency of the local budgets from the center – all shared
taxes collected on the local level have to be 100% directed to the center, and only after-
wards are redirected to the regions. In times of high inflation, this process additionally
deprived the regions of already earned revenues.
In contrary to the mentioned standard arguments of tax assignments among different
tiers, after 1999 we find many unified redistributive taxes on the local level. Due to
growing differences in revenue capacities of the regions, this led to an increase of reve-
nue disparities and horizontal imbalances between the regions. Consequently, the weight
of transfers in local revenues, which had decreased from 27% in 1998 to 15 % in 1999,
rose considerably and reached 35% in 2004.
                                                
27 the social tax is in fact a payroll tax and is contributed by the local employersFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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According to the Budget Code 2004, above-plan revenues collected at the local level
can not be withdrawn by the center and stay at the local level, which enjoys spending
autonomy. However, interviews with local hokims revealed, that spending autonomy for
these revenues in reality is very limited because they have to be spend for under- and
unfunded mandates.
Turkmenistan
In Turkmenistan, the genuine local taxes have a low revenue potential and constitute
only a negligibly small share of local revenues. Since 1993 Turkmenistan had 17(!) local
taxes with little revenue potential. Only in 2000 the number of local taxes was cut to 5
(advertisement tax, targeted duty for developing territories of cities, settlements, and
villages, duty that paid by the owners of car parks, duty for sale of cars, and duty from
dog keepers). As it is presented in the Table 12 below, their share in the total local reve-
nues constituted about 3% in 2001-2003.
EPT shares assigned to the local governments according to the registration place of
enterprise and VAT shares remained revenues of crucial importance for sub-national
budgets. A part of local revenues comes in the form of royalty for natural resource ex-
traction. The assigned shares depend on the regional fiscal capacity and are set on a
yearly basis. Reportedly they can be changed even during the fiscal year on an ad-hoc-
basis. Revenues above the planned level are withdrawn by the center. This design of
shares taxes does not create incentives on the local level. In 1995, the shares of EPT and
VAT in local revenues constituted 37%. Although the importance of these revenues
diminished to 24% in 2003, their role in local budgets funding still remained substantial.
The tax reform of 1997 highlights the dependency of local budgets from centrally
taken decisions. It brought about the increase of the VAT rate from 18% to 20% and a
two-stage decrease in the EPT rate from 37% in 1996 to 35% in 1998 at the same time.
It also changed the flat 8% PIT to a eight-bracket progressive PIT with the range of rates
from 8%-25%. Thus, the share of PIT in local budget funding rose from 8% in 1995 to
21% in 2003. With the approval of the Tax Code 2004, the progressive rates for eight
brackets were replaced with a flat 10% rate, making local revenues shrink anew. Addi-
tionally, the centralized wage setting in the huge public sector of Turkmenistan
28 makes
PIT an almost exogenous parameter for local budgets. Above-plan revenues can not be
withdrawn by the center and stay at the local level, which has a spending autonomy con-
cerning these revenues.
29 However, no such cases are reported so far, because in case of
unexpected revenues the level of assigned expenditures is raised during the fiscal year.
                                                
28 In Turkmenistan, only few enterprises were privatized. In mid 2000, 200 small-scale companies of the
list consisting of 4300 were privatized. For the medium-scale enterprises this ratio constituted 6 out of
280. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2003)  “Turkmenistan: Country profile”, Y 38183 p. 26
//www.eiu.com
29 Turkmenmillichasbat (2005) “Decentralization of state governance and local self- governance develop-
ment in Turkmenistan”, mimeo, p.5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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A structure of local revenues that leaves nearly 95% for shared revenues and official
transfers suggests that the role of the genuine local revenues in local budgets funding in
Turkmenistan is negligible. Regions are fully dependent of centrally set limits and cent-
ral financing. The assignment of transfers (dotations and subsidies) is used to balance
local budgets.
Table 12 Structure of local revenues in Turkmenistan  (%)
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
V A T 1 72 02 01 61 5
E P T 2 01 01 0 9 9
P r o p e r t y  t a x 14553
PIT 8 17 17 18 21
L o c a l  t a x e s 2333
N o n - t a x  r e v e n u e s 11111
T r a n s f e r s 2 34 54 04 54 5
O t h e r  r e v e n u e s 3 0 2323
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Own calculations based on data from Turkmenmillichasbat (2005) “Decentralization of state governance and
local self- governance development in Turkmenistan”, mimeo, based on the data from MoF of Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
In Uzbekistan we find a broader tax base for genuine local revenues. The adoption of
the Tax Code 1997 allowed to increase their share in local budget revenues from 11%
on 1997 to 18% in 1999
30. In 1999 property tax and land tax were defined as local,
making rise the share of genuine local taxes to 20% for the years 2000-2003. New taxes
including property, infrastructure development, and environmental taxes got more im-
portance. However, the legislative provisions of local taxes were not workable in terms
of fiscal decentralization. Some of the “local” tax rates and bases were defined centrally.
The Cabinet of Ministers defines the rates of land tax and property tax each year with
the approval of the yearly Budget law. Furthermore, the latter had substantial admini-
stration costs thus its net revenues approached zero
31.
                                                
30 Nutridinov, Haydarov (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in Uzbekistan”, Tashkent, p. 30, mimeo
31 Ibid., p. 25Fiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Table 13 Structure of local revenues in Uzbekistan* (%)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
VAT 19.7 16.1 24.3 21.0 17.1 20.4 18.3 18.9 15.8
EPT 32.0 29.6 20.8 13.3 0 12.7 8.6 7.5 6.9
Entrepreneurial activity 0.7 0.1 1.3 2.1 2.6 3.6 4.0 3.4 2.6
PIT 13.5 15.5 21.4 13.6 19.0 14.9 14.4 14.0 14.2
Property tax physical
persons 0.3 0 0 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.6
Property tax legal persons 5.2 2.9 4.0 4.7 4.8 6.4 4.7 2.9 5.3
Excise tax 8.7 4.8 14.1 16.3 17.5 19.5 12.1 10.6 10.0
Environmental tax 0 1.1 4.4 4.4 3.8 4.8 4.1 4.2 5.0
State duty 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.7
Land tax 5.9 0.3 6.3 6.9 7.5 7.3 5.4 3.7 3.7
Infrastructure develop-
ment 1.8 1.6 0.3 2.0 1.8 2.5 2.4 3.9 3.3
Water tax 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.7
Duties and non-tax reve-
nues 3.9 2.7 2.6 5.1 4.8 9.5 7.9 11.4 11.2
Transfers 3.0 14.1 18.8 22.2 10.6 17.1 16.9 18.6 21.1
Total* 97 90 120 114 92 122 101 101 102
Source: Own calculations based on data from Nutridinov, Haydarov (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in
Uzbekistan”, Tashkent, mimeo.
Note: * These officially reported data are obviously inconsistent in some queues. Therefore care has to be
taken in the interpretation of single lines
The role of shared taxes in local budget financing in Uzbekistan decreased steadily
(Table 13). The share of EPT and VAT, that constituted 52%
32 in local revenues in
1995, fell to 23% in 2003. Tax rates other than VAT and PIT were approved each year
in the budget resolution. For example, the EPT rate declined gradually each year from
35% in 1998 to 18% in 2004. The lowest and upper PIT bracket decreased in 2001 from
15 to 12 minimum wages and from 40 to 36 respectively. In 2004, upper and lowest PIT
brackets equaled 13 and 30 minimum wages. Thus, the contribution of progressive (four
                                                
32 Actually during 2000-2003 nearly 90% of local revenues were represented by PIT, VAT, CIT, and
transfers – Turkmenmillichasbat (2005) “Decentralization of state governance and local self-governance
development in Turkmenistan” p. 50, mimeo￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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brackets for rather high rates of 15%-40%
33) PIT has increased from 14% in 1995 up to
19% in 1999 while falling to the initial level of 13% in 2004. These frequent changes in
the tax legislation, added by frequent changes in the assigned revenue shares (Table 15)
made the contribution of shared taxes unpredictable for the regions.
The center provides only weak commitments concerning above-plan revenues. Al-
though those revenues may to be withdrawn by the center, at the same the local level has
no spending autonomy for additional revenues, and spending has to be agreed with up-
per levels. In practice, in case of above-plan revenues the level of centrally planned ex-
penditures is raised during the fiscal year.
34 Clearly this mechanism does not create in-
centives to raise local tax revenues.
In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the assignment of shared taxes so far has not been
unified, i.e. different regions receive different shares of these taxes. Local administra-
tions de jure have influence upon this process, but de facto can use social capital (per-
sonal connections) to push their interests at higher levels. That leads to the question,
whether centrally assigned taxes in fact served the role of equalizing intergovernmental
transfers or whether have been used for political ends (either gratification or punishment
of local rulers). The negativee correlation of regional GDP and assigned shares in gen-
eral corroborates the equalizing assumption: Higher shares are assigned to less devel-
oped regions (Table 14, Table 15).
Table 14 Revenue shares for centrally assigned taxes* (Turkmenistan)
2001 2002 2003












Ahalskiy 80 80 0.6 80 80 0.7 80 80 0.9
Ashhabad 31 31 2.1 14 14 3.0 25 25 2.2
Marykskiy 80 80 0.7 80 80 0.7 80 80 0.9
Dashoguzskiy 80 80 0.6 80 80 0.6 80 80 0.9
Balkanskiy 49 49 1.4 20 20 1.6 41 41 2.5
Lebapskiy 80 80 0.6 80 80 0.8 80 80 1.0
Correlation -99 -99 -94 -94 -92 -92
Source: Own calculations based on data from Turkmenmillichasbat (2005) “Decentralization of state governance and
local self-governance development in Turkmenistan”, mimeo based on data from MoF of Turkmenistan
Note: * correlations for shares of central taxes assigned to the oblast and GDP per capita in the oblast in the respective
year.
                                                
33 The brackets were targeted to the minimum wage level after to 1998. Prior, the brackets were set in
absolute terms.
34 Nutridinov, Haydarov (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in Uzbekistan”, Tashkent, p. 41, mimeoFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Table 15 Revenue shares for centrally assigned taxes* (Uzbekistan)
2001 2002
Veloyat VAT EPT PIT GDP per
capita
VAT EPT PIT GDP per
capita
Karakalpakstan republic 100 100 100 0.41 100 100 100 0.38
Andijanskaya 100 100 100 0.87 100 100 100 0.82
Buharskaya 23 20 50 1.01 32 20 50 1.06
Djizzakskaya 100 100 100 0.64 100 100 100 0.68
Kashkadaryinskaya 69 64 100 0.77 100 99 100 0.78
N a v o i n s k a y a 5 85 45 0 1 . 3 6 7 25 45 0 1 . 5 4
Namanganskaya 100 100 100 0.61 100 100 100 0.59
Samarkandskaya 100 100 100 0.69 100 100 100 0.69
Surhandarjinskaya 100 100 100 0.76 100 100 100 0.76
Syrdarjinskaya 100 100 100 0.85 100 100 100 0.78
Tashkentskaya 56 51 50 1.04 61 56 50 1.05
Fergananskaya 39 34 100 0.85 80 65 100 0.84
Horezmskaya 100 100 100 0.75 100 100 100 0.71
Tashkent 14 10 16 1.75 6 6 17 1.62
Correlation* -76 -75 -89 -80 -82 -89
Surce: own calculations, Nuriev (2003) “The questions of fiscal decentralization in Republic of Uzbekistan”, Finance
p.11, p.22
Note: * correlations for shares of central taxes assigned to the oblast and GDP per capita in the oblast in the respective
year.
In a comparative view, it can be stated, that despite high quantitative decentralization
indicators in all countries under consideration at least 85-90% of local budget revenues
depend on decisions taken by the central government. Genuine local taxes, although
introduced to all countries, play a minor role in financing and depend on centrally set
rules. A common feature of all three countries is the substantial reliance on revenue-
sharing mechanisms. This situation is undesirable in terms of fiscal decentralization,
since high reliance on variable taxes affected by frequent cahnges of the central tax pol-
icy exposes the local budgets to uncertainty and poor predictability of fiscal flows. This
implies a lack of fiscal choice depriving local government accountability and incentives.
By and by, the countries approved provisions that allowed sub-national governments to
keep the revenues received above the plan. However, due to underfunding and/or limi-
ted spending autonomy de facto no incentives arose from these provisions.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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Chapter 6. Intergovernmental transfers/grants
The two major dimensions of intergovernmental transfers include vertical (central ver-
sus local government) and horizontal (units of the same levels of government) imbalan-
ces. The system of transfers should ensure not only the correction of vertical/horizontal
imbalances, but also the predictability, understandability, and timeliness of local budge-
ting. Strict and democratically legitimized rules of transfer assignment should leave no
room for corruption and illegal negotiation processes. Stability in transfer setting is a
prerequisite for incentive creation at the local level. If, in case of donor regions, additio-
nal revenues are completely withdrawn by the center or, in case of receiving regions,
deficit covering by central transfers is anticipated as an automatism, no incentives are
created.
Inherited by the FSU system, the intergovernmental transfers at the early stages of
transition in Kazakhstan (“subsidies”)
35, Turkmenistan (“dotations”), and Uzbekistan
(“subsidies”) represented either general-purpose or targeted intergovernmental grants.
The vertical imbalance was solved with the help of gap-filling intergovernmental trans-
fers that could be negotiated during the fiscal year. The amount of the transfers has been
fixed every budget year anew. The system of transfers was supplemented with a mutual
offset mechanism and soft budget constraints set by the central budgets, especially in
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Although the early budget reforms pushed the countries
to distinguish between general-purpose and targeted grants, equalization transfers still
were not formula-based and did not account for regional particularities as changes in the
number of population. Till nowadays, no clear mechanisms of targeted funds allocation
have been set up. The calculation of “needed expenditures” is still based on the extra-
polation or of last years expenditures. Standards and norms for cost calculation in servi-
ce provision are missing, which creates a high risk for underfunded mandates at the lo-
cal level.
Regional disparities
The need for intergovernmental transfers stems from differences of the regional fiscal
capacities. In the resource-based economies of Central Asia these disparities are mostly
based on the fact of an uneven geographic distribution of the natural point-source natu-
ral resources.
                                                
35 IMF observance of standards and codes of Fiscal transparency in Kazakhstan “The role and types of the
transfers were not clearly specified by law. However, evidence suggests that some of the transfers were
conditional (for instance, contingent on satisfactory tax collection standards being achieved), the others
appeared to be block transfers, and the investment earmarked transfers”Fiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Kazakhstan
In Kazakhstan the disparities of per capita regional fiscal capacities have intensified since
the development of the countries oil reserves has taken up pace since 1998. High average
per capita income figures characterize those areas where oil was extracted, while the cor-
responding figures for the other regions remained very low. The regions Jambyl, Almaty,
South Kazakhstan, North Kazakhstan, and Akmola remain constantly poor. In 1998 the
GDP per capita in Atyraurskaya oblast was 5 times higher than in Jambylskaya oblast.
Until 2004, the regional disparities driven by the oil boom increased further. The coeffi-
cient of variation of GDP per capita has increased from 0.52 to 0.78, while the difference
between minimum and maximum GDP per capita climbed to 12.
Table 16 Kazakhstan GDP per capita by oblast (indexes)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 Kazakhstan 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Akmola 0.53 0.73 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.56 0.58
Aktyubinsk 1.17 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.13 1.08 1.20
Almaty 0.54 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.42
Atyrau 2.08 2.38 3.42 3.33 3.72 4.05 4.18
East Kazakhstan 1.09 1.03 0.90 0.85 0.78 0.72 0.74
Jambyl 0.41 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.35 0.35
West Kazakhstan 0.85 0.96 1.16 1.21 1.40 1.20 1.28
Karaganda 1.18 1.25 1.21 1.10 1.03 1.03 1.04
Kzyl-Orda 1.05 1.01 0.95 0.85 0.76 0.79 0.81
Kostanai 0.57 0.49 0.55 0.56 0.79 0.71 0.81
Mangystau 1.68 2.05 2.47 2.26 2.84 2.18 2.38
Pavlodar 1.49 1.13 1.23 1.23 1.10 1.15 1.23
North Kazakhstan 0.75 0.75 0.58 0.68 0.60 0.55 0.59
South Kazakhstan 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.44 0.42 0.38
Almaty City 2.39 2.34 2.03 2.26 2.02 2.32 1.88
Astana 1.44 1.81 1.82 1.73 1.76 2.05 2.03
Min 0.41 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.35 0.35
Max 2.08 2.38 3.42 3.33 3.72 4.05 4.18
Difference 5.10 6.58 10.42 10.79 10.28 11.64 12.04
Coefficient of variation 0.52 0.57 0.69 0.68 0.74 0.79 0.78
Source: own calculations based on data from the Statistic committee of Kazakhstan￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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Uzbekistan
Regional disparities in Uzbekistan are less severe, but show the same trend. In Uzbekistan,
natural resource extraction so far contributes only a minor part to the regional disparities. The
major part stems from the distorted industrial structure inherited by the Soviet Union, which
had brought about some industrial giants located in strategically selected regions. Thus the
oblasts Buhara, Navoi, Tashkent, and Tashkent city remain stable above the national avera-
ge. The development of Tashkent city is defined by its status as capital, the oblast Navoi is a
center of gold and uranium mines. Oil and gas production so far are dispersed throughout the
country, the same is the case for the agrarian sector. The autonomous republic of Karakal-
pakstan and the oblast of Horezm are burdened with the Aral Sea problems. The oblast Su-
hardarjo located at the Afghan border has only limited access to transport infrastructure, the
densely populated oblast Ferghana lacks land resources.
Table 17 Uzbekistan GDP per capita by oblast  (indexes)
1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004
Uzbekistan 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Karakalpakstan republic 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.42
Andijanskaya 0.79 0.79 0.87 0.87 0.82 0.76 0.74
Buharskaya 0.93 0.95 1.19 1.01 1.06 1.11 1.08
Djizzakskaya 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.64 0.68 0.80 0.77
Kashkadaryinskaya 0.92 0.78 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.74 0.75
Navoinskaya 1.14 1.10 1.22 1.36 1.54 1.66 1.70
Namanganskaya 0.65 0.55 0.59 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.45
Samarkandskaya 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.64 0.60
Surhandarjinskaya 0.60 0.66 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.69 0.66
Syrdarjinskaya 0.82 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.77
Tashkentskaya 0.94 0.93 0.93 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.03
Fergananskaya 0.93 0.87 0.90 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.76
Horezmskaya 0.92 0.88 0.97 0.75 0.71 0.69 0.67
Tashkent 1.57 1.59 1.65 1.75 1.62 1.67 1.68
Max 1.57 0.59 1.65 1.75 1.62 1.67 1.70
Min 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.42
Difference 2.95 2.08 2.11 3.30 4.03 3.92 4.02
Coefficient of variation 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.46
Source: Nutridinov, Haydarov (2005) “Fiscal decentralization in Uzbekistan”, Tashkent, mimeo, based on data from
Statistic committee of UzbekistanFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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During transition, the increasing importance of the extracting industry against the
background of an declining manufacturing industry became the driving force of the une-
ven regional development. From 1997-2004 the coefficient of variation of regional
disparities has increased from 0.31 in 1997 to 0.46 in 2004. With natural resource
extraction taking up pace during next years, regional disparities will increase further,
following the Kazakh path.
Turkmenistan
With respect to Turkmenistan, limitations on regional GPD data allow only an approxi-
mation of regional disparities. Here we use fiscal capacity, i.e. major revenues assigned
to the local budgets (here for simplicity we assume that 100% of revenues are collected
by the local budgets) without transfers as a proxy for disparities. Over the past decade,
the regional development in Turkmenistan has been driven by gas extraction activity,
mainly concentrated in the Amu Darya basin and near the Caspian Sea. The enterprises
of the gas sector became major contributors of Turkmenistan’s consolidated budget
(47% in 2003 and 34% in 2004)
36. Unfortunately, the revenues of local budgets are not
perfect related to the economic development of the respective regions. Major taxes as-
signed to the local budgets are paid centrally, still based on the registration principle of
the big enterprises like “Turkmengaz”, “Turkmenneftegaz”, and “Turkmenneft”. Thus,
although Maryyskiy and Akhalskiy velayats are the places where the natural gas is
extracted, the revenues flow into Ashgabad and Balkanskiy local budgets. The tax from
the use of earth interiors is collected mainly to the Akhalskiy and Balkanskiy velayats.
There are significant disparities in the distribution of per capita revenues that are so-
metimes inversely correlated with the expenditure needs. The largest expenditure needs
are in Lepubskiy, Maryyskiy, and Dashoguzskiy velayats due to the high number of ad-
ministrative units and population density. Furthermore, the expenditure needs of Le-
pubskiy and Dashuguzkiy velayat are growing at faster rates
37. At the same time, the
highest local fiscal revenues per capita are observed in Ashgabad and Balkanskiy velay-
at. Fiscal capacities of Maryyskiy, Dashoguzskiy, and Lepubskiy velayats are rather li-
mited (Table 18).
                                                
36 VAT collected from the gas sector in 2003 constituted 57% of total VAT collections. For the year 204,
this rate constituted 29%. In the year 2003, EPT collections from the gas sector reached 61% of the total
EPT collections. For the year 2004 this weight reached 33%.
37 The sizes of local budgets of Turkmenistan increased unevenly during recent years. In comparison to
the year 2001, the expenditures of the local budgets increased by 75.8% for Akhalskiy veloyat, by 36.6%
for Ashgabad city, by 38.8% for Maryyskiy velayat, by 53.4% for Dashoguzskiy velayat, by 74.5% for
Balkanskiy velayat, and by 94.1% for Lepabskiy velayat.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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Table 18 Local Revenues of Turkmenistan by oblast








Akhal 89 235 299 71 167 425 71 167 686
Ashgabad 631 988 463 1,406 1,173 470 516 839 812
Maryyskiy 45 128 551 46 124 482 34 123 736
Dashoguzskiy 29 69 516 27 79 512 23 90 744
Balkanskiy 223 607 528 366 684 604 674 986 798
Lepubskiy 9 34 526 33 79 646 115 198 735
Total 129 260 490 246 295 523 170 304 745
Variations 1.39 1.10 0.19 1.68 1.17 0.16 1.18 1.00 0.06
Min 9 34 299 27 79 425 23 90 686
Max 631 988 551 1,406 1,173 646 674 986 812
Max/Min 73 29 2 51 15 2 30 11 1
Source: Turkmenmillichasbat (2005) “Decentralization of state governance and local self- governance development in
Turkmenistan”, mimeo based on data from Turkmenistan MoF,
Note: Other revenues do not include transfers
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Vertical imbalances
For the period under consideration, the indicators of vertical balance
39 (shares of all lo-
cal revenues net of transfer in local expenditures) in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were
comparatively lower than in Turkmenistan. All three countries exhibited an improve-
ment of this indicator during recent years (see Table 19). Most interesting, this process
was accompanied by a further increasing in regional disparities. The latter had the hig-
hest magnitude in Kazakhstan. More narrow definitions of vertical imbalance like the
mismatch between genuine local revenues and expenditures, demonstrate a very sub-
                                                
38 Data limitation does not allow us to analyze horizontal imbalances with ex-ante fiscal revenues
39 Vertical imbalance is measured as a share of local revenues without transfers in local expenditures.
Vertical imbalance coefficient equal to 1 means perfect vertical balance
. However, we should mention
about biases in the vertical imbalance measure we use. From the one side, the calculated coefficient of
vertical imbalance might be underestimated due to the evidence of local budget arrears and substantial
quasi-fiscal activities especially common for the early 90
th. Furthermore, the vertical imbalance might be
larger taking into account still limited possibilities of local governments to borrow from other sources
except higher-level budgets and soft constraints that existed until recent years. This issue was most acute
for Uzbekistan and TurkmenistanFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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stantial size of imbalances for all three countries. Taking into account the level of ge-
nuine local revenues available to the local governments, the vertical balances of Uzbe-
kistan will be around 0.15, for Turkmenistan it would be close to 0.05. Recent tax inno-
vations (2002) of Kazakhstan allowed it to reach a level at approximately 0.14.
Table19:  Vertical imbalance structure
1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Turkmenistan 0.50
40 n/a n/a n/a 0.55 0.65 0.56 0.55 n/a
Uzbekistan n/a 0.89 0.74 0.87 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.80
Kazakhstan n/a n/a 0.71 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.80 0.76 0.64
Source: own calculations based on the data of Ministries of Finance of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan made several attempts to develop a methodology for calculating trans-
fers. The first one took place during the budgetary reform of 1999, when the calculation
process started to be unofficially based on resolution No.529/99.
41 The second attempt
happened in 2004. Resolution No. 916 from 2004 concerning the prognosis of official
transfers started to work based on Law No. 602, concerning the volumes of official
transfers 2005-2007 (2004). The new Budget Code for the first time established the vo-
lume of transfers for 3 years, thus providing a better predictability of revenues at the
local level, less grounds for corruption during the negotiation process, and better incen-
tives for revenue rising at the local level. In fact, the legislation concerning the calcula-
tion is poorly enforced and can be said to have a mere declarative character. According
to local hokims and governors, in practice transfers till nowadays are just covering the
budget gap
42 Targeted transfers, however, in fact are often used as a kind of flexible
instruments for financing different funds and “private” joint stock companies (like the
JSC “National Innovation Fund” or the JSC “International Airport of Astana City”) as
quasi-budget institutions. The utilization of these funds is hard to trace.
43 However, the
treasury regularly publishes cases that demonstrate, how money declared as spent on a
certain measure is in fact is saved and stays with the local budgets.
44
                                                
40 Turkmenmillichasbat (2005) “Decentralization of state governance and local self-governance develop-
ment in Turkmenistan”, mimeo, p. 27
41 see in detail the discussion in Wooster, James (2000):” The Intergovernmental Fiscal Reform in Ka-
zakhstan: Progress to Date and Recommendations for the Future” In: Kazakhstan Economic Trends 1
st
quartal 2000, pp 36-53
42 based on personal interviews in Almaty, Karaganda and Astana oblasts
43 “Budget Process in the Caspian Countries: Experience of Kazakhstan and Azerbaidjan.” Policy Studies
No. 2 (07) April 2005, Public Policy Research Center, Almaty
44 Schynbekov, D.:” Finansovye osnovy mestnogo chozjajstva: vzaimootnošenija s respublikankskim
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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In Uzbekistan, at the time of the budgetary reform of the year 2000, two kinds of
grants have been defined, namely dotations and subsidies. The first constitutes an equa-
lization transfer. The second are targeted transfers, the objectives of which should be
defined by higher levels of the government. Furthermore, there exists a non-transparent
heading “mutual settlement grant”, which - like in Russia - 
45plays an non-transparent
correction role during budget execution. The dotations of Uzbekistan are based on ad-
hoc coverage of the deficit. Susidies according to Uzbek authors bear a “subjective cha-
racter” and lack concrete objectives, since regional programs are not elaborated.
46 All
transfers remained to be negotiated either during the budget process or unofficially du-
ring the fiscal year. In Turkmenistan, the same characteristics of intergovernmental
transfers can be observed, albeit with a still higher amount of discretionary decisions
taken at the central level.
In spite of certain improvements in budget legislation, the transfer systems of Ka-
zakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan poorly address the issues of vertical imbalan-
ces. Still not based on regional formulas and standards and norms for cost calculation at
the local level, transfers do not ensure full funding of the local services to be provided to
the population according to the national standards. This worsens the accountability of
local administrations substantially. The main local tasks education and health care are
chronically under-funded. Their functioning has significantly worsened over time
47 State
programs are simply not implemented at the local level because of underfunding.
48 Ad-
ditionally, the transfer system is not transparent and thus does not create incentives for
revenue mobilization at the local level. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the transparen-
cy is aggravated by the presence of discretionary mutual offset mechanisms. In both
countries, the problem of underfunding is often solved with the “voluntary” help of local
state and even private enterprises
49 – a highly undesirable result in terms of a business-
friendly environment.
                                                
45 as for Russia, it is stated, that “the nature of transfers included in “mutual settlements” is not clear at
all”; Tabata, Shinichiro: “Transfers from Federal to Regional Budgets in Russia: A Statistical Analysis”.
In: Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 1998, 39, No. 8, pp.447-460
46 Nuriev, Sch.(2003): “Voprosy fiskal`noj decentralizacii v Respublike Uzbekistan”. In: Bozor, Pul, Va
Kredit No. 11, 2003, Taschkent
47  Economist Intelligence Unit (2003)  “Turkmenistan: Country profile”, Y 38183, pp. 16-24
//www.eiu.com; Economist Intelligence Unit (2003)  “Uzbekistan: country profile”, pp. 13-19
//www.eiu.com; Economist Intelligence Unit (2003)  “Kazakhstan: country profile”, pp. 21-28
//www.eiu.com;CER (2004) “Major directions of reform of government bodies at the local level in Uzbe-
kistan”, Report 2004/05, Tashkent, p.34
48 surveys undertaken in 2002 among hokims in Kazakhstan showed, that the number of settlements
without medical care, who according to the Ministry of Health should have been reduced to 112, in fact
still stood at 1094; Institut Ekonomiceskich Issledovanij (2003): “Analiz gosudarstvennych funkcij, ich
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿"￿#￿￿￿￿ ￿$$￿%￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ %￿&￿￿￿"￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ )(￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿*￿ ￿￿**
49 Myradova, Ch. et al (2005): “Administrativnajy Reforma na Mestach”. In: Ekonomiceskie Obosrenie
No. 1, (64) 2006, TaschkentFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Horizontal imbalances
The second important issue that should be addressed with intergovernmental grants are
the horizontal imbalances between same levels of the budget. They are usually caused
by non-homogeneous distribution of natural resources, problems of certain regions with
climate and topography, and other regional peculiarities that are responsible for differing
regional fiscal capacities. The correction of horizontal fiscal imbalances faces a trade-
off: On the one hand, equity is welcomed as a means of poverty-fighting. On the other
hand, excessive equalizing reduces incentives for increasing local productivity and labor
migration and thus fosters poverty in the long term.
Table 20 shows, that the variation of regional per capita revenues before transfers in
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan has been substantial. After accounting for transfers
50, this
indicator shows an excessive equalization. With the help of intergovernmental transfers,
the coefficient of variation in Kazakhstan was reduced by half from 1.06 to 0.56 in
2004. The latter became possible partially due to the system of withdrawals and sub-
ventions introduced in 1999. In Turkmenistan, the effect of intergovernmental transfers
in was a bit slighter and allowed cutting the coefficient of variation from 0.76 to 0.24. In
Uzbekistan the variation of regional per capita revenues is less severe before transfers.
Accordingly, equalization after transfers is most obvious: In 2003, the intergovernmen-
tal transfers assignment resulted in a reduction of the coefficient of variation of revenues
in Uzbekistan from 0.44 before to 0.12 after transfers.
Table 20 Coefficient of variation of regional per-capita revenues by oblast
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005_I
Turkmenistan
Revenues before transfers 0.77 0.58 0.76
Revenues after transfers 0.26 0.15 0.24
Uzbekistan**
Revenues before transfers 0.36 031 0.26 0.39 0.31 0.30 0.35 0.44 0.38
Revenues after transfers 0.17 0.20 n/a 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.18
Kazakhstan*
Revenues before transfers 0.45 1.14 1.09 1.06 1.02
Revenues after transfers 0.32   0.71 0.67 0.56 0.53
* not taking into account Astana city, ** not taking into account Tashkent city
Data source: MoF of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, own calculations
                                                
50 due to data limitations, we did not distinguish between equalizing non-targeted and targeted transfers
here, albeit this is formally not correct; in the absence of a clear assignment of tasks and program finan-
cing however, we found it hard to distinguish between targeted and non-targeted grants per se even if the
data were present. it should be noted, that due to the inclusion of targeted transfers equalization will be
overestimated￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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The excessive equalization of regions observed in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan may
be considered as an heritage of Soviet times. At early stages of transition this excessive
equalization could be justified to alleviate the distributive effects resulting from the se-
vere output decline. That may still be a feature for the three countries under considerati-
on. From the incentive point of view however, the degree of equalization in Turkme-
nistan and Uzbekistan is disappointing and intensifies credibility problems of the center
concerning the withdrawal of local over-plan revenues.Fiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Chapter 7. Sub-national debt/borrowing
Local borrowing serves as a financing instrument for local development projects and
provides financial autonomy and strong incentives to the local level. For the central le-
vel however, local borrowing bears high risks of non-transparent financial operations
and defaults. It constitutes uncertainties for the macroeconomic management and for the
control of sub-national and overall public debt. Therefore, sub-national autonomy
should be explicit, legally and politically well-defined. Good administrative and mana-
gerial capacities at the local level and efficient governance structures are prerequisites
for local borrowing.
At the very beginning of transition, in none of the countries under consideration
restrictions on the size of the deficit, the level of debt, and the purpose of borrowing for
the local budgets were existent. Due to underdeveloped financial markets and limited
possibilities to borrow from the private sector, the sub-national governments had to bind
themselves with loans from higher-levels of the government. Thus, local borrowing was
under control of the center, but local autonomy kept to be restricted by decisions of the
center on the other hand.
The local borrowing in Kazakhstan at the early stage of transition was mainly pre-
sented by short-term borrowing from the center (MoF). The loans provided by the cent-
ral government were soft in the sense that they were interest-free and the MoF often
“forgot” them. Major problems of debt redemption were experienced either with the
poor oblasts such as Zhambyl, or with the oblasts that had the highest GDP and revenue
per capita e.g. Kostanai and Pavlodar oblasts.
51. After the budget reform of 1999, Ka-
zakhstan was the first of the Central Asian countries who set up rules for local borro-
wing. Ceilings for yearly local borrowing, for the debt for the current year, and for debt
servicing payments have been set.
52 The purpose of borrowing was still under control by
the center. The borrowed funds had to be spent on investment programs and other pro-
grams envisaged by the budget legislation. The local government had no power to pro-
vide state guarantees for borrowings. The first local bonds in Kazakhstan were issued by
the boom-regions oblast Mangistau and the cities Astana and Almaty in the year 1999.
Later this type of borrowing spread all over the country and borrowed amounts increa-
sed substantially.
With the adoption of the Budget Code in 2004 the conditions of borrowing have been
restricted. The Budget code prohibited borrowings of local budgets from abroad. Addi-
tional ceilings for the total local debt have been fixed at the level of 25% of the revenues
of the respective budget. The responsibility for the debt redemption and servicing was
transferred completely to the local budgets. The borrowed funds are to be spent on
implementation of investment projects and/or covering cash gaps. These restrictions are
                                                
51 World Bank (2000) “Kazakhstan Public Expenditure Review”, WB Report 20489-KZ, Vol. II, p. 92.
52 At the end of the decade of the 90th, the Law of Kazakhstan “On State and Guaranteed state borrowing
and debt” #464 from 2 August 1999 came into effect. In addition, some provisions were set by the law of
Kazakhstan “On Budget System” (Article 22).￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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in line with international standards and do not hamper incentives for local development.
However, due to the still underdeveloped and politically controlled credit market for
poorer regions problems with access to credit reduce the overall efficiency of this in-
strument.
Up to 2001, the legislation of Uzbekistan allowed the local budgets to be approved e-
ven without defining a source of deficit finance. Sub-national borrowings were prohibi-
ted only in 2001 with enforcement of the “Law on the Budget system”. The law required
the local budgets to be balanced. However, it allowed short-term borrowing from central
government to cover temporary cash gaps. The same development can be observed in
Turkmenistan. Till the year 1996, there were no formal restrictions for local debt and
borrowing. After enforcement of the 1996 law “On the Budget system of Turkmenis-
tan”, according to Article 13, the local budgets could not be planned with deficits any
more, local borrowing in the open market was prohibited. Such state of affairs in Uzbe-
kistan and Turkmenistan seems to restrict the sub-national government autonomy. Ho-
wever, the permission to borrow would have been meaningless for these two countries
since nearly all their local expenditures have to be centrally approved.
Conclusion
In Central Asia, we find high quantitative indicators of fiscal decentralization, but fiscal
autonomy at the local level is close to zero, at the expenditure as well as at the revenues
side. The transfer system lacks transparency and predictability. This is partly due to the
legal transition status of the countries. Many new laws still lack backing by supporting
administrative rules and thus enforcement is weak. However, the centralized state
structure also plays a role. Administrative decentralization, which delegates competence
to the local level is lagging behind in all three countries. Most parameters of the budget
are set centrally. Especially in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, information and control
rights rest completely at the central level. Local self-governance, which might play a
role contrasting the state administrative bodies is underdeveloped in all countries and
enjoys no fiscal autonomy at all. In a comparative view, Kazakhstan is well ahead of the
other two countries, who lag behind in any term. Compared to other transition countries,
however, Kazakhstan is lagging behind as well.
Clearly fiscal decentralization in Central Asia so far does not follow the Chinese mo-
del. Although like in China political parties would be strong enough to execute effective
control at the local level, at the center there seems to exist a deep mistrust against dele-
gation of information and authority. But it is just this delegation that makes incentive
mechanisms work. If fiscal decentralization in Central Asia shall render positive effects
on growth, governance and corruption, the design of fiscal decentralization has to be
changed carefully together with administrative and political decentralization but without
endangering control. Further research on the micro level is needed to clear the grounds
of this magic triangle.Fiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Appendix A
Table A1 Kazakhstan : Assignment of tasks to the local level
Law on The budget system (02.04.99) Budget Code (1.1.2005)
Pre-school, primary, secondary, additional and voca-
tional education
Purchase and delivery of textbooks for state oblast
educational organizations, additional sport education
of youth, primary vocational education, general edu-
cation, school Olympiads of local level, general voca-
tional education, increasing qualification and re-
training, rehabilitation and social adaptation of chil-
dren.
Provision of health care services at local level
Financing local health-care programs
Provision of guaranteed level of health care services,
sanitary and epidemiological protection of population,
purchase of medicines according to the Law of Ka-
zakhstan, blood production for local health-care or-
ganizations, other tasks except those that are financed
from the Republican budget
Military enrollment Military enrollment
Local tasks of public order Local tasks of public order
Targeted social welfare payments in accordance with
the decisions undertaken by Maslikhats
Social welfare payments to orphans, old people, and
disabled.
Employment programs
Housing and utilities programs Gasification of settlements
Local cultural programs The list of responsibilities includes different cultural
programs of local importance, e.g. support of theater
and music art of local level
Industry and construction at the local level Local construction programs
Agriculture
Local programs of environment protection
Local transport maintenance and construction Transport and telecommunications
Debt servicing Debt servicing
SEZ programs
General public services of local importance General public services of local importance
Transfers to the other budgets Transfers to the other budgets
Regulation of economic affairs, for instance support of
entrepreneurial activity
Water rescue service
Elimination of emergency situations of local impor-
tance
Other local importance programs
Source: the Law of Kazakhstan “On budget system”, The Budget Code of Kazakhstan.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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Table A2a  Uzbekistan: De-facto assignment of tasks in, According to the law
 “On the budget system” effective from 2001
Local government
Education Kindergartens, Schools, Professional colleges
Health care Hospitals, rural medical points, medical assistant and obstetric point, emergency aid, blood sta-
tions
Culture Libraries of oblast importance, museums, theaters, editorial staff of local importance
Defense Negligible expenditures on defense departments preparation of military specialists for “OSO
“Vatanparvar””
Fire service Departments of professional fire service
Public order Traffic – patrol service
Justice -
Utilities Transfers to the enterprises that supply heating and hot water
Social wel-
fare
Fully undertaken by local government
Agriculture Maintenance of veterinary laboratories, stations for animals diseases’ control, anti-epizootic
measures, state seed inspection
Source: Kuchkarov, Haydarov et. all (2004) “Local Budgets through prism of problems”, Ekonomicheskoe obozrenie,
Vol. 6.
Table A2b De jure assignment of tasks in Uzbekistan, According to the law
“On budget system” effective from 2001
Local government State government
Science, education, culture, health care, sport Financing
budget organizations that are financed by the Republic
of Karakalpakstan, oblasts, and Tashkent city)
Science, education, culture, health care, sport Financing
budget organizations that are financed by the State)
Social welfare, social protection Social welfare
Defense, public order
Justice
Government bodies of state power in Karakalpakstan,
and local government bodies
Government bodies of state power
Maintenance of budget organizations of Republic
Karakalpakstan, and local government bodies of differ-
ent economic sectors
Maintenance of budget organizations of state govern-
ment bodies of different economic sectors
Maintenance of targeted programs and measures for
development of economic sectors according to the
legislation
Maintenance of targeted programs and measures for
development of economic sectors according to the
decisions of Cabinet of Ministers
Development of agricultural sector
Other purposes Other purposes
Source: The Law of Republic of Uzbekistan “On budget system” #158-II, Article 22-23.Fiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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Table A3 Turkmenistan: Assignment of tasks to the local level
Local budgets Central budget
Production and non-production construction according
to the plans of the territory development
Production and non-production construction, research
and development, environment protection and other
works
Accomplishment of cities, settlements, and villages
Maintenance of housing, utility objects, roads of local
importance
Organizations of health-care, education, culture, and
sport of local importance
Health-care, education, culture, and sport
social provision
Maintenance of bodies of local self-government and
local executive bodies, other purposes
Maintenance of bodies of state government
Justice, defence, and public order
Special fund for financing works for overcoming con-
sequences of natural disaster
Reserve fund
Debt servicing
Other measures that are to be financed in centralized
manner.
Source: The Law of Turkmenistan “On the budgetary system” from 18.06 1996￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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Appendix B
B1 Revenues of Kazakhstan
In 1999 the Budget System Law was adopted. This law defines the revenue sources of the republican and
local budgets as follows (Art. 7):
Tax Shares (min – max (2003)) Term assigned
Central taxes:
Corporate income tax (EPT) 50% permanent;
Excise tax on alcoholic drinks 50% permanent;
Individual income tax (PIT) 100% permanent
Social tax 100% permanent






Share of profits of locally owned state enterprises;
Dividends from locally owned joint-stock companies;
Share of production sharing arrangements (PSAs);
Environmental pollution fee 20% permanent
Receipts from the lease of communal property and land.
Local fees:
Use of local roads;
Registration fees of individual entrepreneurs;
State registration of title to real estate and real estate transactions;
Revenues from capital transactions
Transfers from the republican budget
General-purpose transfers
Earmarked transfers
Earmarked transfers for developmentFiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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B2 Revenues of Uzbekistan
Nationally administered shared taxes with shares of up to 100 percent allocated to subnational budgets as
specified on an annual basis in a resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers
Tax Shares (min – max (2003)) Term assigned
General national taxes
Excise tax
Value added tax 100% - 6% year
Corporate income tax 100% - 7% year
Personal income tax 100% - 13% year
Unified tax on SME





Property tax on enterprises
Property tax for physical persons
Land tax
Unified land tax on agricultural enterprises
Local taxes and fees set at the provincial level within parameters established in the annual budget
resolution
Infrastructure development tax
Vehicle fuel consumption tax
Fees charged for the right to trade in commodities
Registration fee for entrepreneurial activity
Non-tax revenues identified in various legislation, including
Proceeds from privatisation
Revenues from leasing of local government property
Administrative fees
Revenues from economic activities
Revenues from auctions and lotteries
Voluntary contributions from enterprises and individuals
Deposits into extra-budgetary funds for local tax collection or frugality beyond official prognoses
Transfers from higher tiers of government
Intergovernmental transfers of general-purpose budgetary support
Targeted grants
Mutual settlements between budgets for deficit reduction (including forgiveness of budgetary loans from
higher tiers)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr.261
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B3 Revenues of Turkmenistan
Tax Shares (min – max (2003)) Term assigned
List of general central taxes shared
Value added tax 80% - 25% year
Corporate income tax 80% - 25% year
Payment for the use of Earth interior 0% 80% year
Social tax
Property tax
List of local taxes defined by the Order of the President as of 14.12.1993
Tax for construction of objects of industrial purpose in recreation areas
Recreation duty
Trade permission duty
Licensed fee for the right to conduct trade of vine and vodka
Targeted duties for maintenance of militia, development of territories, etc.
Advertisement tax
Duty from dog keepers
Licensed fee for the right to conduct auctions and lotteries
Duty for issue of apartment voucher
Tax for re-sale of cars, computers
Duty for the use of local symbolic
Duty for operations conducted at stock exchange
Duty for participation in horse racing
Duty for participation in totalisator at the hippodromes
Duty for car parking
Duty for conducting filming and telephotography
List of local taxes defined by the Tax code(2004)
Advertisement tax
Targeted duty for developing territories of cities, settlements, and villages
Duty that paid by the owners of car parks
Duty for sale of cars
Duty from dog keepers
Intergovernmental transfers:
Dotations (equalization grants)
Subventions (targeted grants)Fiscal Decentralization in Centralized States
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